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EVALUATING HISTORIES OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE IN CASES
INVOLVING THE TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS
RICHARD C. BOLDT, J.D.*
In recent years, researchers and policymakers have paid increas-
ing attention to the impact that substance abuse' on the part of par-
ents is having on the child welfare and family court systems in the
United States.2 In order to assess how courts have been dealing with
the intersecting problems of parental substance abuse and child ne-
glect and abuse, I have reviewed a number of judicial opinions in
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. I wish to thank Karen
Czapankiy andJana Singer for their collegial support and good advice, and Eileen Canfield
for her research, clear thinking, and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. There is a fair amount of confusion surrounding the related terms "addiction,"
"chemical dependency," and "substance abuse." See generally, MARK KELLER & MAIRI MC-
CORMACK, A DICTIONARY OF WORDS ABOUT ALCOHOL 6-27 (2d ed. 1982) (setting out terms
used to describe types of addiction and alcoholism); Aubrey Lewis, Introduction: Definitions
and Perspectives, in SCIENrIFIC BASIS OF DRUG DEPENDENCE 5, 5-11 (Hannah Steinberg ed.,
1969) (defining "drug dependence"); Steven S. Nemerson, Alcoholism, Intoxication, and the
Criminal Law, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 393, 397-99 (describing addiction in terms of "loss of
control"); Frank A. Seixas et al., Definition of Alcoholism, 85 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 764
(1976) (setting out definition of "alcoholism"). The use and abuse of both legal drugs
(especially alcohol and tobacco) and illegal drugs is widespread in the United States.
Three levels of drug involvement are often identified: use, abuse, and dependence. See
Rosalind E. Griffin, Assessing the Drug-Involved Client, in FAMILIES IN SOCIE'Tr THE JOURNAL
OF CONTEMPORARY HUMAN SERVICES (Assessment Series 2, 1991). "'Use' refers to the taking
of a drug for pleasure in order to achieve a sense of well-being." Id. "Abuse" refers to use
of alcohol or other drugs that "interfere[s] with the individual's ability to carry out ex-
pected responsibilities." Id. "Chemical Dependency" describes the status of an individual
who "persists in using drugs, disregarding any negative consequences and exhibiting toler-
ance to the drug and withdrawal symptoms when he or she cannot have the drug." Id.
"Addiction" is an umbrella term that includes people who are chemically dependent in the
sense that they have developed a tolerance to their substance of abuse and experience
withdrawal symptoms when they decrease or cease consumption of that substance. More
generally, however, addiction centers on the twin phenomena of loss-of-control and denial.
See Report of the AALS Special Committee on Problems of Substance Abuse in the Law Schools, 22 J.
LEGAL ED. 35, 40 (1994). Depending upon the drug of abuse, a person can experience
loss-of-control and/or denial even if he or she is not physically or chemically dependant
upon a substance. Thus, addiction subsumes a broad category of substance abusing behav-
iors. See Nemerson, supra.
2. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, BLENDING PERSPECTIVES AND
BUILDING COMMON GROUND: A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CHILD PRo-
TECTION (1999) [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS]; NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (CASA), No SAFE HAVEN: CHILDREN OF SUB-
STANCE-ABUSING PARENTS (1999) [hereinafter CASA, No SAFE HAVEN].
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cases involving the termination of parental rights.3 Perhaps the most
significant pattern I have discerned in the cases is a marked ambiva-
lence on the part of judges with respect to the behaviors associated
with alcoholism and other drug addiction. This ambivalence about
whether to regard addiction as a disease. or a moral failing is signifi-
cant, because courts in termination cases often rely upon unexplored
assumptions about the nature of addiction and its effective treatment.
This Article will seek to demonstrate that a number of these
preconceptions are not in accord with recent scholarship in the fields
of clinical social work and psychiatry, especially as this work relates to
the treatment needs of women. It will identify some of the chief char-
acteristics that distinguish female addicts from their male counter-
parts, in order to demonstrate a few of the ways in which traditional
treatment often fails these patients. The Article will then summarize
some of the work that has been undertaken to develop an alternative
model for the treatment of women with substance abuse problems. In
the final analysis, good judicial practice in cases involving the parental
rights of women addicts must recognize the effects of referring a
mother to, and evaluating her within, the prevailing male dominated
models of substance abuse treatment.
I. THE PROBLEM OF ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY IN CASES INVOLVING
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
A good example of the thoroughgoing ambivalence that runs
through many of these opinions is found in the 1996 termination of
parental rights case, In re Devon S.,4 which was decided by a Connecti-
cut trial court. In concluding that the statutory standard for termina-
tion had been met by clear and convincing evidence, the court makes
special mention of "[t] he inability or unwillingness of each parent to
3. I obtained these cases by conducting an electronic (text-based) search for opinions
available through Westlaw that contained the words "parent," "addiction," and "substance
abuse." Some jurisdictions make family law decisions rendered by trial courts and inter-
mediate appellate courts available in this electronic data base, while many do not. As a
consequence, I do not claim any scientific validity for my research methodology, as I have
no basis to assess whether the group of cases I have collected and evaluated are necessarily
representative of termination cases more generally.
Despite this methodological shortcoming, I can still report that certain consistent pat-
terns emerged as I went through these cases. Moreover, these recurring features did not
appear to be dependent upon the particular legal or factual circumstances of the jurisdic-
tions represented. Thus, notwithstanding the anecdotal nature of this research, I have
reason to believe that these patterns in the courts' reasoning and analysis are of general
significance to lawyers, judges, social workers, mental health professionals, and others con-
cerned about the interrelated problems of substance abuse and child welfare.
4. 1996 WL 677378 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996).
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deal with their [sic] substance abuse problems and successfully com-
plete drug/alcohol treatment over a 15-month period .... 5
Now, what I think is most significant about this statement, which
is not atypical of the language contained in many of the opinions I
have reviewed, is that it contains alternative characterizations of the
parents' substance abuse for purposes of assigning them responsibility
for their behavior. The court's description of the parents as being
"unwilling' to abstain from the use of alcohol and other drugs implies
an understanding of their conduct that I want to term intentionalist. 6
By contrast, the court's simultaneous characterization of the parents
as "unable" to achieve abstinence suggests a causal account of the very
same behavior. 7 Importantly, this alternative account tends to play
out very differently within the context of our conventional blaming
practices. 8
The intentionalist account of conduct, which generally is em-
ployed in American law, regards most human activity as having been
produced through the agency of an individual's free will.9 In the sub-
stantive criminal law, and in the law of contracts, torts, and elsewhere,
this intentionalist account permits the legal system to assign responsi-
bility to people for their behavior, on the ground that each of us gen-
erally should be held accountable for the consequences of the choices
that we make.1° Thus, operating within this perspective, a judicial
finding that a parent has been unwilling to abstain from the abuse of
alcohol or other drugs, in a case in which that history of substance
abuse has raised concerns about that parent's neglect or abuse of his
or her child, permits the court to render a decision with respect to
parental rights ,that holds the parent accountable for his or her con-
duct without violating basic norms governing responsibility and
desert.
On the other hand, the court's recognition of the parents' inabil-
ity to avoid substance abuse generates a different set of inferences
5. Id. at *8. See also In reJasmin J., 1996 WL 518134 at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996)
("[I]t is very apparent that Carolyn has not personally rehabilitated herself, since she is
unwilling or unable to make the necessary sacrifices required for substance abuse treat-
ment . . .).
6. See Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA.
L. REv. 2245, 2246 (1992) [hereinafter The Construction of Responsibility]; MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 86 (1987).
7. See Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility, supra note 6, at 2264-85.
8. See id. See also Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091
(1985); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Desert, Punishment, and Criminal Responsibility, 49 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 47 (1986).
9. See KELMAN, supra note 6, at 86.
10. See id.
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about the origins of the conduct in question, and about the individual
actor's relationship to that conduct. This perspective, which is more
characteristic of the helping professions and medicine, views human
behavior as the product of a matrix of causal factors-including he-
redity, early childhood experience, and ongoing environment-that
necessarily determines choice.1" This causal account is well suited to
diagnosis and treatment, because it directs helping professionals to
evaluate and adjust those features within the causal matrix associated
with a client's or patient's conduct that are both amenable to change
and productive of a given pathology.1 2 It is less well suited, however,
to the needs of the legal system in circumstances where the assign-
ment of responsibility is a primary goal, because our blaming conven-
tions tend to recognize an excuse for actors who could not have
avoided the conduct that is the subject of the inquiry.1 3
In the past, I have written about how conflict between the inten-
tionalist and causal perspectives is managed within legal institutions.1 4
Ordinarily, we know intuitively which of the two should predominate
at any given moment, and we therefore experience very little disso-
nance in evaluating the conduct of others in order either to assign or
withhold responsibility.' When it comes to alcoholism and other
drug addiction, however, many of us experience considerable disso-
nance, as we attempt to sort through these competing points of view.
Stated simply, addiction forces both the intentionalist and causal
points of view to the surface.' 6
The profound impact that parental substance abuse is having
upon child welfare has been made abundantly clear by researchers
and others.17 But, ambivalence over the moral status of addictive be-
havior, which I believe characterizes popular conceptions of alcohol-
ism and other drug addiction as well as judicial attitudes in these
cases, must be managed by these courts if they are to provide a coher-
ent response to the problem. I have found two strategies consistently
employed by judges in order to deal with the simple fact that most of
11. See Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility, supra note 6, at 2304-06.
12. See id. See also Seymour Halleck, Responsibility and Excuse in Medicine and Law: A
Utilitarian Perspective, 49 LAw &'CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 129 (Summer 1986).
13. See Halleck, supra note 12, at 128.
14. See Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility, supra note 6, at 2248.
15. See id. at 2264, 2279. See also P.F. STRAWSON, SKEPTICISM AND NATURALISM: SOME
VARIETIES 38 (1986); P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT 1,
6-13 (1974).
16. See Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility, supra note 6, at 2247.
17. See, e.g., CASA, No SAFE HAVEN, supra note 2, at 11-24.
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us think of alcoholism and other drug addiction as both intentional
conduct and a chronic disease.
The first strategy is centered on the basic legal principle that a
child's best interests should govern custody decisions and decisions
with respect to parental rights.' 8 Invariably (and necessarily), courts
in contested cases who rule against the claims of an addicted parent
explain that they are doing so to protect the safety and well being of
the child, not to punish the parent.19 Essentially, the strategy here is
to avoid having to confront the notion that a person should not be
punished for conduct over which he or she had no control (could not
have avoided), by characterizing the court's decision as protective of
the child's interest and therefore not punitive.
This strategy is inadequate for two reasons. First, I am skeptical
that the long-term best interest of many of the children in these cases
is better served by their placement in the foster care system or
through the termination of their parents' rights than it would be by
the provision of intensive and appropriate services designed to main-
tain the family system and assist its members toward more healthy
functioning.2" But even if I am wrong about this, and even if such an
array of potentially effective services is beyond the budgetary means of
the relevant agencies, this strategy of focusing on the best interests of
the children is still unlikely to ameliorate the underlying difficulty I
have identified.
Notwithstanding the stated goal of protecting the best interests of
the children, it is clear that parents whose parental rights are termi-
nated as a consequence of their substance abuse experience such a
decision as punitive.2 1 Indeed, I have been struck as I have read these
opinions by how thoroughly this reality pervades both the structure of
the courts' analysis and the very language they employ.
22
18. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-112(d) (1999); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.190(4)
(1999). See generallyJOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973).
19. See, e.g., In reLuis C., 554 A.2d 722, 727 (Conn. 1989); In reT.J.O., 527 N.W.2d 417,
421 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
20. See CASA, No SAFE HAVEN, supra note 2, at 77-86; Dorothy Roberts, The Challenge of
Substance Abuse for Family Preservation Policy, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 72 (1999).
21. See In re Brandon A., 630 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Fam. Ct. Monroe Co. 1995).
22. With respect to the language employed by courts in these cases, see, e.g., In reT.J.O.,
527 N.W.2d at 421 ("[P]arents must move quickly to rectify their personal deficiencies.").
As to the more general claim that termination of parental rights is, in important respects,
understood to be punitive, see In re Brandon A., 630 N.Y.S.2d at 852 (describing termina-
tion of parental rights as "final and harsh," and recognizing that "a high degree of due
process must be afforded to respondent parents in these cases where the government
wishes to sever the [parent-child] relationship."). Although not conclusive on this point, it
1999]
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Given the less than complete success of the first strategy, it should
come as little surprise that the great majority of the cases I have evalu-
ated also employ a second rhetorical strategy for harmonizing the in-
tuition that alcoholism and other drug addiction is a disease with the
recognition that the involuntary termination of a parent's rights to his
or her child is generally experienced as punitive. This second strategy
attempts to remove the .mitigating effect created by the court's con-
cededly ambivalent understanding of addiction as a disease, by focus-
ing on the parent's receipt of substance abuse treatment and
subsequent.failure to obtain sobriety.23 I regard this strategy as rhe-
torical, because it permits a court to terminate parental rights at least
in part on the basis of a parent's refusal of or failure at treatment
rather than simply because of his or her addiction.
What generally goes begging in the account offered by these
courts is any meaningful information about the kind or kinds of
"treatment" that were offered,24 and whether this "treatment" was ap-
propriate given the particular characteristics of the parent's disease.
25
Instead, "drug treatment," or "substance abuse treatment" is simply
employed as a monolith, as if all treatment modalities, and all sub-
stance abuse treatment services, were alike. Indeed, it is almost as if
the offer of "substance abuse treatment" functions like an inoculation,
cleansing the process of any normative dissonance that otherwise
might result from a court's assignment of responsibility (and imposi-
is worth noting the reluctance shown by courts to terminate the parental rights of parents
who suffer from other conditions that are as fully disabling as addiction. See, e.g., In re
Michael G., 194 Cal. Rptr. 745, 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (finding no termination of paren-
tal rights even though parents were developmentally disabled); Leyva v. Brooks, 244 S.E.2d
119, 121 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (finding no termination in case involving deaf and mute
parent); In re McDuel, 369 N.W.2d 912, 916 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (finding no severance of
parent-child relationship where mother had multiple sclerosis). But see In re C.W., 616 So.
2d 127, 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that illness beyond parent's control accom-
panied by neglect can support termination of parental rights).
23. See, e.g., In reJ.C., 924 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1966) (reversing the Washington Court of
Appeals' decision that the parent's rights could not be terminated on a showing that she
had refused to be treated for alcohol abuse or had failed at alcohol abuse treatment but
without a showing of "current" use of alcohol); In re K.R., 904 P.2d 1132 (Wash. 1995)
(affirming the lower courts' termination of parental rights in part on the basis that the
parents had "been extremely slow and selective in availing themselves of the court-ordered
services and ... [had] failed to complete the services ordered.").
24. For a good discussion of the different types of substance abuse treatment modali-
ties, and the particular patient characteristics that are relevant in selecting one modality or
another, see AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ADDICTION MEDICINE, PATIENT PLACEMENT CRITERIA FOR
THE TREATMENT OF SUBSTANCE-RELATED DISORDERS (2d ed. 1966). See also A. Thomas Mc-
Lellan et al., Increased Effectiveness of Substance Abuse Treatment: A Prospective Study of Patient-
Treatment "Matching," 171 J. NERV. & MENT. Dis. 597 (1983).
25. See McLellan et al., supra note 24.
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tion of a punitive outcome) for conduct that is understood, at least in
part, as itself the product of a chronic disease.
The strategic clout derived from this focus on a parent's failure to
make "meaningful progress on the path towards rehabilitation"26 after
receiving substance abuse treatment is particularly well illustrated by a
1995 Washington Supreme Court decision, In re the Dependency of
KR.,27 where the majority of the court held that parental rights could
be terminated on the basis of a showing by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the parents had failed to avail themselves fully of offered
substance abuse treatment services, even in the absence of proof that
ongoing conditions of neglect or abuse were present.2" As Justice
Johnson's dissent put it: "The majority today... defines unfitness as
failure to remedy conditions, and then requires clear and convincing
proof only of 'failure to remedy' and no additional proof whatsoever
of 'conditions.' "29
This shift in focus, from a consideration of the parents' underly-
ing addiction to an examination of their choices with respect to partic-
ipation in treatment, is extraordinarily powerful. Rarely (at least in
the opinions I have reviewed), does a court explore why the treatment
failed, or even what constitutes failure."0 Indeed, in its recent report
to Congress on Substance Abuse and Child Protection, the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services described as "typical" a
case in which an addicted mother gives birth to a child who
is soon taken into foster care. Handed a list of local treat-
ment agencies (whose programs are likely to be full), the
mother is told to 'get clean', if she wants her child back, but
is given little or no further assistance in securing treatment.
Meanwhile, the child welfare agency places the child in a fos-
ter home with adoption potential. If the mother happens to
be successful (without help from the child welfare agency),
reunification is a possibility. If not, the child may be adopted
relatively quickly. Many would consider this a standard prac-
tice and adequate performance. Yet, while the child welfare
agency may secure a permanent home for the child, the
birth mother is likely to have received little or no treatment
and thus may be reported again in 12 to 18 months with a
new infant. The problem has not been solved, for either the
26. In re Devon S., 1996 WL 677378 at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996).
27. 904 P.2d 1132.
28. See id, at 1140.
29. Id. at 1142 (JohnsonJ., dissenting).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 39-42.
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mother or her children, often because inappropriate or very short-
term treatment was the woman's only option. 1
II. ASSESSING JUDICIAL ASSESSMENTS OF SUBSTANCE
ABUSE TREATMENT
If we carefully scrutinize the highly stylized account one regularly
encounters in these cases of a parent's failure to successfully avail him-
self or herself of offered substance abuse treatment, we can see that
judges often proceed on the basis of unexplored assumptions regard-
ing the nature of addiction and its effective treatment. To the extent
that these preconceptions are not in accord with the best understand-
ing of substance abuse treatment as reflected in recent scholarship in
the fields of clinical social work and psychiatry, 2 they may produce
unfair or inaccurate results in some number of cases. In general, I
have observed two categories of problems.
A.
First, in some of the opinions I have reviewed, while the judges
recognize that addiction to alcohol and other drugs is a disease, they
fail to acknowledge that this disease can be chronic and progressive.33
In these cases, parents face the prospect that parental rights may be
terminated pursuant to unrealistic criteria. This is particularly true
with respect to findings that a parent has "failed" at treatment 34 be-
cause he or she has not obtained a stable level of sobriety after the
passage of a given period of time-often 12 months.35 In addition,
misapprehensions about the nature of addiction and recovery may
31. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 7 (emphasis added). The National Center
on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, in its recent study, reported
that "61.3 percent of respondents [to its survey of child welfare agency professionals] say
that what treatment is 'available' determines what treatment is 'appropriate' for the par-
ent." CASA, No SAFE HAVEN, supra note 2, at 2. They further reported that "the type of
treatment provided to parents through the child welfare system is determined almost ex-
clusively by what is available at the moment, rather than a careful assessment of need." Id.
at 5.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 46-73.
33. CASA, No SAFE HAVEN, supra note 2, at 19.
34. Or has failed to accomplish "personal rehabilitation" as the law in some jurisdic-
tions provides. See, e.g., In re Migdalia M., 504 A.2d at 537.
35. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.105-89, 111 Stat. 2115,
conditions the states' receipt of federal funding upon their adherence to new time-lines
that reduce the time allowed to resolve cases of child neglect or abuse from 18 months to
12 months. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2.
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lead a court to characterize a relapse or a series of relapses as a failure
of treatment rather than as part of the recovery process itself.36
While there is a great deal that can be said about the application
of rigid time limits for substance abuse treatment, it is worth acknowl-
edging that a parent's time-line for treatment may simply be at odds
with his or her child's developmental time-line. Others have written
about the difficulty of reconciling these distinct time-lines, and about
the importance of acting in children's best interests.37 I do think,
however, that it is dangerous to adopt a practice of concluding auto-
matically that a parent with a substance abuse problem who has not
achieved total abstinence within a preset period of time has "failed at
treatment."
With respect to relapse generally, it is important that child wel-
fare officials and judges understand that a parent's relapse is not nec-
essarily an indication that treatment has failed, given the chronic
nature of addiction. Often relapses, when identified and addressed,
represent a phase in the process of recovery, from which a parent can
learn and advance toward the ultimate goal of abstinence. 8
In my review of these cases, I regularly encountered opinions in
which this more subtle assessment of relapse was lacking. A represen-
tative example of this sort of problem may be found in In re Devon S.
mentioned above.39 In this case, the court noted that the mother had
been referred to a number of substance abuse treatment programs,
and that "[h]er 'off-again, on-again' attempts at treatment were
marked by spotty attendance, non-compliance with program rules and
periodic relapses."40 Based upon this record, the Devon Court con-
cluded that the mother had failed at treatment, and on that basis pro-
ceeded to terminate her parental rights.41  What goes
unacknowledged in this case, however, is evidence that the mother
had continued to return to treatment following each relapse, and had
continued to search for interventions that would assist her in keeping
her "promises to [the child welfare agency] and the court that she
would cooperate with substance abuse therapy and remain drug-
free."42
36. See CASA, No SAFE HAVEN, supra note 2, at 81.
37. See CASA, No SAFE HAVEN, supra note 2, at 6.
38. Id. at 81.
39. See In re Devon S., 1996 WL 677378, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1996).
40. Id. at *8.
41. See id. at *10.
42. Id. at *8. See also In reJasminJ., where the court implies that the mother's repeated
pattern of starting one treatment regime after another and then leaving each shortly there-
after demonstrated that she was not trying to achieve recovery. 1996 WL 518134, at *3
1999]
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The reluctance of some courts to scrutinize relapses with suffi-
cient care to distinguish between those parents who have failed at
treatment and those who have not yet succeeded, works a hardship on
both mothers and fathers. In addition, a second related shortcoming
in the way that many courts evaluate instances of relapse impacts wo-
men in particular. As the recent U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services Report to Congress points out, a pattern of relapse
on the part of some women:
may point to a more serious disorder that was not initially
diagnosed, such as post traumatic stress syndrome resulting
from past sexual or physical abuse or current abuse. In or-
der to address these issues in women's lives, such as stress
connected with being a single parent, low income, being
identified as a maltreating parent, and having few social re-
sources, any or all of which may bring about relapse, ...
[f1ormal relapse prevention components that offer means
for early detection of relapse and tools for intervention
should be included in every treatment program.4"
Clearly, a woman whose treatment needs include attention to
these sorts of issues, who has not received appropriate services or af-
tercare,4 4 should not be penalized for an "unwillingness" to under-
take a process of recovery. All too rarely, however, in my review of
cases, did I find judges who carefully considered the specific elements
of the treatment offered to the women before them in order to make
a determination about whether their individual psycho-social charac-
teristics had been met with truly appropriate interventions.
B.
The last point directs attention to a second category of problems
relating to courts' assessments of the adequacy of the substance abuse
treatment that parents receive. Here I want to focus almost exclu-
sively on the treatment needs of women.
In the past few years, researchers have begun studying some of
the ways in which women who suffer from alcoholism or other drug
addictions differ from their male counterparts.4 5 In light of these dif-
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 1996). Here again, the court fails to consider that this parent
continued to enter treatment after each relapse, and that other factors, including a poor fit
between the treatment she was offered and her individual needs, could have accounted
for, or contributed to, her inability to complete a program.
43. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 18.
44. See CASA, No SAFE HAVEN, supra note 2, at 6.
45. See Sheila B. Blume, Alcohol and Drug Problems in Women: Old Attitudes, New Knowl-
edge, in TREATMENT CHOICES FOR ALCOHOLISM & SUBSTANCE ABUSE 183 (H.B. Milkman &
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ferences, clinicians have reported that a number of elements charac-
teristic of traditional substance abuse treatment may be poorly suited
to the needs of many women patients.4 6 In my review of cases, I saw
substantial evidence of many of the features that the treatment litera-
ture identifies as characteristic of women patients, but I rarely en-
countered an assessment of whether the treatment offered to women
facing the termination of their parental rights had been responsive to
these needs.4 7 In the absence of any explicit discussion of this matter,
and given the nature of most treatment resources that are in place in
the community, it is fair to assume that the treatment made available
to a great many women is based upon therapeutic models developed
for men.4
8
There is a vast literature on the nature of addiction and on the
variety of models of treatment that have been employed.4 9 To date,
there remains considerable controversy regarding the elements that
go to make up the disease and the measures thought most likely to
provide effective treatment.50 Moreover, until fairly recently, most of
the available research involved male addicts and treatment modalities
L.I. Sederer eds., 1990); Peter G. Fellios, Alcoholism in Women: Causes, Treatment, and Preven-
tion, in ALCOHOLISM AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE IN SPECIAL POPULATIONS 11 (Gary W. Lawson &
Ann W. Lawson eds., 1989); Helen E. Ross, Alcohol and Drug Abuse in Treated Alcoholics: A
Comparison of Men and Women, 13 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RES. 810 (1989).
46. See Lani Nelson-Zlupko et al., Gender Differences in Drug Addiction and Treatment: Im-
plications for Social Work Intervention with Substance-Abusing Women, 40 SOC. WORK 45, 48-49
(1995); Brenda V. Smith, Improving Substance Abuse Treatment for Women, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE
Rrv. 490 (1990).
47. See, e.g., In re Devon S., 1996 WL 677378 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1996); In re
Jasmin J., 1996 WL 518134 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 1996).
48. See Nelson-Zlupko et al., supra note 46, at 48-50. See also REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 2, at 5.
49. On the nature of addiction, see generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAG-
NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS ( 4 '5 ed. 1994); WORLD HEALTH OR-
GANIZATION EXPERT COMMITTEE ON DRUG DEPENDENCE, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES No. 775, TwENTY-FIFrH REPORT (1989); WORLD HEALTH ORGANI-
ZATION EXPERT COMMITTEE ON ADDICTION-PRODUCING DRUGS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZA-
TION TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES No. 273, THIRTEENTH REPORT (1964); Bruce K. Alexander,
The Disease and Adaptive Models of Addiction: A Framework Evaluation, in VISIONS OF ADDIC-
TION: MAJOR CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON ADDICTION AND ALCOHOLISM 45 (Stanton
Peele ed., 1988); Ralph E. Tarter & Kathleen L. Edwards, Vulnerability to Alcohol and Drug
Abuse: A Behavior-Genetic View, in VISIONS OF ADDICTION: MAJOR CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES
ON ADDICTION AND ALCOHOLISM 67 (Stanton Peele ed., 1988). For a good discussion of the
various treatment models, see AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ADDICTION MEDICINE, PATIENT PLACE-
MENT CRITERIA FOR THE TREATMENT OF SUBSTANCE-RELATED DISORDERS, supra note 24.
50. See, e.g., HERBERT FINGARETTE, HEAVY DRINKING: THE MYTH OF ALCOHOLISM AS A
DISEASE (1988); Stanton Peele, Introduction: The Nature of the Beast, in VISIONS OF ADDICTION:
MAJOR CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON ADDICTION AND ALCOHOLISM, supra note 49, at xi.
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designed for men.5" All the same, certain points of agreement with
respect to the treatment needs of women have begun to emerge.
Addicted women are more likely than men to report that they
began using drugs in response to a specific traumatic event, including
incest and rape, or other instances of sexual and physical abuse. 2 As
noted earlier, relapse among women receiving substance abuse treat-
ment is also highly correlated with posttraumatic stress resulting from
past or ongoing physical or sexual assaults.53
Relationships figure more heavily in the substance abusing behav-
ior of women, and in their success or failure at treatment. 54 Addicted
women are "more likely than not to come from families in which
drugs were used as a primary coping strategy by one or more family
members, ''55 and are more likely than men to have substance-abusing
partners.56 Addicted women tend to be assigned primary responsibil-
ity for childcare in their families, and generally receive less encourage-
ment and support from family members than do male recipients of
substance abuse treatment 7 In fact, many women are discouraged
from entering treatment by other family members who perceive the
woman's participation "as a threat to her ability to care for the fam-
ily,"5 8 and many leave treatment prematurely in order to take care of
dependent children. 59  Not surprisingly, given these characteristics,
outcome studies have shown that men's ability to succeed in treatment
is much less heavily dependent upon the behavior of their significant
others than is the case with women in treatment.60
Women with alcohol and other drug addictions are more likely to
experience feelings of guilt, shame, and anxiety than are their male
counterparts, and have dramatically higher rates of depression than
51. See Edle Ravndal & Per Vaglum, Treatment of Female Addicts: The Importance of Rela-
tionships to Parents, Partners, and Peers for the Outcome, 29 Irr'LJ. ADDICTIONS 115, 116 (1994).
52. See Richard C. Boldt, A Study In Regulatory Method, Local Political Cultures, and Juris-
prudential Voice: The Application of Federal Confidentiality Law to Project Head Start, 93 MICH. L.
REv. 2325, 2369 (1995) [hereinafter Head Start]; Nelson-Zlupko et al., supra note 46, at 46.
53. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 18.
54. See Boldt, Head Start, supra note 52, at 2369-71; J. Grant Macdonald, Predictors of
Treatment Outcome for Alcoholic Women, 22 Irr'L J. ADDIcrIONs 235 (1987); Ravndal &
Vaglum, supra note 51, at 116.
55. Nelson-Zlupko et al., supra note 46, at 46.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 48.
60. See Macdonald, supra note 54, at 244. See also Sheila B. Blume, Alcohol and Other
Drug Problems in Women, in SUBSTANCE ABUSE: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 794, 802 (Joyce
H. Lowinson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992).
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do male addicts.6" As a group, substance abusing women "have lower
expectations for their lives than male addicts, and they express greater
preoccupation with simply surviving and minimizing discomfort than
getting ahead in life."6 2
As a general matter, women suffering from addiction to alcohol
or other drugs are likely to be in positions of relative powerlessness,
are likely to have low self-esteem, little control over their environ-
ments, and to feel hopeless.63 In light of these characteristics, it only
stands to reason that women have had less success in substance abuse
treatment programs than have their male counterparts.64 In the first
place, traditional treatment programs often provide little or no assist-
ance in the way of child care.65 Moreover, the use of confrontational
therapeutic approaches designed to overcome a patient's denial,
which have been shown to be effective with many men, may have disa-
bling effects with those women patients who respond with increased
feelings of shame, guilt, or depression.66 Similarly, treatment pro-
grams that include elements of the twelve-step model developed by
Alcoholics Anonymous may not be effective for women whose re-
sponse to instructions to give one's self up to a "higher power" is to
feel even more dependent and less in control of their lives.6 7
Given the strong links between substance abuse and sexual as-
sault among female addicts, the practice in many traditional treat-
ment settings of engaging patients in group sessions with a strong
emphasis upon public confession may be counter-productive. While
the conventional view is that such "cathartic" sessions can have a
"cleansing" effect for addicts, many women may experience the pres-
61. In one reported study, 19% of the alcoholic women interviewed also fulfilled the
diagnostic criteria for major depression, as compared to only 5% of the men under study.
See Blume, supra note 60, at 798 (describing Michie N. Hesselbrock et al., Psychopathology in
Hospitalized Alcoholics, 42 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1050 (1985)). See also Linda J. Beck-
man, Self-Esteem of Women Alcoholics, 39 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 491 (1978).
62. Nelson-Zlupko et al., supra note 46, at 47.
63. See id. at 48. See also Boldt, Head Start, supra note 52, at 2371.
64. See Nelson-Zlupko et al., supra note 46, at 48.
65. See id.
66. See Jan Copeland et al., A Comparison of a Specialist Women's Alcohol and Other Drug
Treatment Service With Two Traditional Mixed-Sex Services: Client Characteristics and Treatment
Outcome, 32 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 81, 82 (1993). See also In re R.B., 696 N.E.2d
1259, 1261 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (quoting trial court as suggesting that "[t]he first ray of
hope ... would be a genuine admission by Mrs. Smith she's got a drug problem.").
67. See David Berenson, Powerlessness-Liberating or Enslaving? Responding to the Feminist
Critique of the Twelve Steps, in FEMINISM AND ADDICTION 67 (Claudia Bepko ed. 1991); Nelson-
Zlupko et al., supra note 46, at 49.
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sure to engage in such discussions as a kind of re-violation, especially
if they occur in mixed-gender groups.68
Finally, the dominant view in many traditional treatment settings
is that a person suffering from alcohol or other drug addiction must
deal with his or her substance abuse before addressing other psycho-
logical or social issues. Some commentators have gone so far as to
describe this as identifying the addict with his or her addiction.6 9
Some recent work has shown, however, that many women respond
better to substance abuse treatment when their addiction is viewed as
one of a number of interrelated issues to be confronted together.
Often, women who are told to put aside a disabling depression, a con-
tinuing sense of grief over a past instance of rape or incest, or ongoing
concerns regarding continuing domestic violence, in order to focus
on their problems with alcohol or other drugs, feel as if the treatment
providers have simply missed the point.7 ° Thus, an evidentiary record
indicating that a mother has attempted treatment in a variety of set-
tings and has left treatment after each attempt, could be an indicator
to a court that this woman has not received appropriate treatment.
71
Particularly if the record also contains evidence of intimate violence,
anxiety caused by extreme poverty, social isolation, or depression,72
courts should look closely at the treatment plan made available to this
parent in order to determine whether the therapeutic pieces were in
place, in an integrated fashion, necessary to insure that she had at
least a fighting chance at overcoming her addiction.
68. See Blume, supra note 60, at 801-02; Nelson-Zlupko et al., supra note 46, at 49.
69. See Nelson-Zlupko et al., supra note 46, at 50. See also In reJasmin J., 1996 WL
518134, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 1996) (reporting expert testimony that "addiction
is ... the most important issue to be addressed. Parenting training is an important goal,
but is subsumed by the need to address the addiction problem.").
70. See Nelson-Zlupko et al., supra note 46, at 48.
71. See, e.g., In reDevon S., 1996 IrL 677378 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1996) (failing to
give weight to evidence that mother continued to return to treatment following each re-
lapse); In rejasmin J., 1996 WE 518134, at *2 (reporting that mother "did what she has
repeatedly done in the past: She was admitted to the [treatment] Program and thereafter,
quit the program," but failing to consider either her willingness repeatedly to attempt
treatment or the suitability of the programs to which she was referred).
72. See, e.g., In re Natashia D., 1997 WIL 345327, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 17, 1997)
(record contained evidence of domestic violence and other "long-standing and severe
mental health problems"); In re T.J.O., 527 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (record
contained evidence of domestic violence and a psychological evaluation indicating that the
mother "has often seen things as beyond her control"); In reDependency ofJ.C., 924 P.2d
21, 24 (Wash. 1996) (record contained evidence that mother's boyfriend had been "physi-
cally abusive" to mother).
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C.
The question, then, is what such a plan would look like. At a
minimum, it would provide mothers with nonconfrontational and em-
pathic counseling directed to exploring the "components of the[ir]
environment that are unhealthy and oppressive and that trigger the
use of drugs. Having identified these sources of struggle and stress,
women can then be helped to develop and use effective, safe, and
nondestructive alternative coping strategies."73
This integrated plan would also include provisions for child care,
referrals for medical services, parenting classes, and gender-specific
counseling groups. All-female groups are especially important not
only to create an environment in which women can share experiences
of past victimization without feeling re-violated, but also to foster the
development of positive, healthy relationships with other women, to
"build support networks and . . . shared experiences ... ""
One particularly compelling example of the kind of integrated
treatment services I have in mind, which I suspect are all too rare, is
detailed in a 1995 article in the journal, Social Work.7 5 The author,
Beatrice Rogoff Plasse, describes parenting groups that were con-
ducted at a day treatment center in New York City over a three-year
period. 6 Plasse reports that sixty of the sixty-eight recovering addicts
who participated were successful at staying drug free for the period of
their day treatment program, which averaged two years. 7 This is a
very positive set of results.
What is significant about this experiment is that many of the is-
sues relating to child development that were raised in the parenting
groups were linked to ongoing work taking place in individual coun-
seling sessions.7 8 Through the use of journal writing, role playing,
and other techniques, participants engaged in a kind of learning that
assisted them in their transition from addiction to recovery.7 9 As
Plasse describes it:
73. Nelson-Zlupko et al., supra note 46, at 50.
74. Id. "Recognition of women's ability to survive horrific experiences gives them the
ability to move beyond the abuse and create environments in which they are not revic-
timized." Id. See also Boldt, Head Start, supra note 52, at 2370.
75. See Beatrice Rogoff Plasse, Parenting Groups for Recovering Addicts in a Day Treatment
Center, 40 Soc. WoRK 65 (1995).
76. See id. at 66-67.
77. See id at 66.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 68-71.
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Central to the model ... is the idea that the childhood and
adult history of each individual becomes the focal point for
integration and synthesis of the ideas about child develop-
ment. Introducing the notion that one's life, no matter how
damaged or filled with pain, has vital things to teach can take
the client from a state of despair and passivity to one of curi-
osity and hope. Parenting can in this way be seen as a sec-
ond chance for healing oneself and one's children. 0
I cannot help but contrast this approach to the one I observed
repeatedly in the cases I read. In opinion after opinion, the court
reported that the parent (usually a mother) had been referred to sub-
stance abuse treatment, and occasionally to anger management
classes, parenting classes, or other similar activities. In every case in
which the mother had failed to obtain sobriety within the mandated
time period, the court's account was that she had failed at drug or
alcohol treatment, and independently, that she had either attended
or failed to complete the other designated activities. In no cases that I
reviewed, did the judge think about or discuss the provision of these
services as interrelated and interdependent. For many addicts, and
for most women who are addicted to alcohol and other drugs, their
addiction is not their identity. Treatment must reach more broadly if
it is to assist as many parents as possible, and judges hearing these
cases must insist that the adequacy of the treatment offered be a factor
in any consideration of the parent's efforts at recovery.
80. Id. at 67.
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